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Abstract
Strategic interactions are governed both by individuals’ preferences for outcomes and by their
expectations about other players’ choices that influence the outcome . The common assumption
that expectations about others are mutually consistent across players allows researchers to infer
preferences from observed strategic decisions. In this paper, I show how players’ beliefs about
other players’ choices systematically depart from this assumption and I explain the consequences
for inferring preferences based on strategic choices.
In the context of altruistic preferences, I document a relationship between an individual’s
preferences and his (implicit or explicit) expectations of others’ actions in modified dictator
games. This relationship is beyond what false consensus or a simple correlation between beliefs
and preferences can account for and is consistent with a more complex relationship of beliefs
and preferences that underlie choices.
I study the impact of these systematic belief differences on players’ strategic actions in a
trust-dictator game. I show that preference incongruencies across different roles in a trust-
dictator game are in line with the documented relationship between beliefs and preferences.
Finally, I demonstrate biases in the estimation of preferences from decisions in this strategic
game under the assumption of mutually consistent beliefs.
1 Introduction
Utility-maximizing decision makers consider two factors when choosing the optimal action in any
strategic interaction: their evaluation of potential outcomes and the likelihood of reaching each out-
come given that action. The perceived likelihood of reaching an outcome depends on the decision
maker’s expectations about others’ actions. As researchers generally do not observe these beliefs,
empirical inference of preferences from observed strategic choices predominantly relies on the as-
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sumption that beliefs about others’ actions are objectively correct (i.e., rational1). Manski (2002,
2004) points out the identification concern associated with relying on this potentially misspecified
assumption in order to separate preferences from expectations in choice data, and he advocates
measuring expectations.
The assumption that expectations are objectively correct includes two premises: first, beliefs on
average reflect the realized outcomes; and second, no systematic variation in expectations exists.
Whereas the first premise provides separation of latent average preferences from latent average
beliefs, the second premise (mutual consistency assumption) allows any variation in choices across
people or time to be attributed to variation in preferences. Recent literature in economics has
considered the fact that mean beliefs may systematically deviate from reality (i.e., overconfidence
(Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Barber and Odean (2001), Malmendier and Tate (2008)) and con-
servatism (Huck and Weizscker (2002)). This research on inaccuracy of beliefs mostly focuses on
the violations to the first premise and does not directly speak to the possibility that different indi-
viduals may have different beliefs, regardless of how mean beliefs compare with reality. Individual
random deviations from common beliefs may not hamper the identification of a ranking in prefer-
ences. However, if beliefs are systematically different across people in a way that relates to their
preferences that influence their actions then we can no longer preference-rank individuals based
on the differences in their actions. Previous studies in psychology and economics document that a
person who has taken a particular action believes that action to be more prevalent among others
than a person who has taken an alternative action (i.e., false consensus (Ross et al. (1977), Marks
and Miller (1987); for review, see Selten and Ockenfels (1998), Charness and Grosskopf (2001)),
which gives us reason to doubt the assumption of mutual consistency.
This paper documents the existence of systematic belief differences across people, discusses how
these differences relate to differences in preferences, and studies the impact of this systematic het-
erogeneity on both the actions people take in strategic interactions and the inference of preferences
based on such actions. The observation that the knowledge of the correct form of this relationship
is essential in informing the data and statistical modeling necessary to achieve unbiased estimates
of the preference distribution, even when expectations are measured, motivates the focus on the
1Although the less restrictive form of rational expectations assumption only requires players to hold accurate beliefs
given their private information, since the heterogeneity in private information is unobserved, this more restrictive
version is often used for inference.
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specifics of the relationship between preferences and beliefs..
The particular application focuses on beliefs and preferences for altruism, an issue that has
received significant attention in the recent experimental literature. Previous studies document
considerable heterogeneity in the concern for others (for a review, see Camerer, 1993), making
altruism an appealing context in which to investigate the extent of decision makers’ common beliefs
about this heterogeneity. Moreover, the fact that some of the behavior in social interactions that
we think of as altruistic may in fact be strategic and selfish given their beliefs, noted previously by
Manski (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002) among others, further motivates the choice of this
context. By focusing on individuals’ degree of altruism and their beliefs about others’ altruistic
actions, I speak directly to these concerns.
In three experiments, I infer subjects’ degree of altruism from their actions in modified dictator
games. I use the linear asymmetric social preferences model introduced by Charness and Rabin
(2002), distinguishing the degree of concern for others when the person has a higher payoff from
when he has a lower payoff than other player. Study 1 directly elicits subjects’ beliefs about others’
choices in modified dictator games, and Study 2 indirectly elicits beliefs by giving subjects risky
decision tasks involving gambles that pay what a random other subject from a past experiment
allocated in a dictator game. In Study 3, subjects face a trust-dictator game and choose between a
social-welfare minimizing allocation and deferring the decision to another person who then makes
a different social allocation decision as a dictator. In this game, the decision of the first player
depends both on his altruism and on his beliefs about what the second person will choose as a
dictator. Therefore, the actions of the first player in this game can be interpreted as altruistic or
simply strategic, depending on his beliefs.
Impact of preferences on beliefs
The first set of results document the impact of an individual’s preferences on his beliefs about
others’ actions. I find three main patterns.
First, I find a considerable amount of heterogeneity across people in their beliefs about how oth-
ers will choose in a dictator game. As expected, a person who prefers a particular outcome is more
likely to believe decision makers will pick that outcome than is another person who does not prefer
that particular outcome. This finding is consistent with the previous literature on false consensus,
and I demonstrate its robustness to several important control factors. I show the systematic belief
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differences are robust to monetary incentives for accuracy, do not depend on whether beliefs and
preferences are elicited first, and are not driven by people with more inconsistencies. I show that the
act of having made a choice has the same impact on belief as one’s future choice or predicted choice.
I also provide the first evidence that implicitly measured beliefs (inferred from decisions involving
gambles on altruism) reflect systematic differences just as explicitly elicited beliefs. Finally, I also
provide the first evidence of heterogeneity in beliefs in a strategic choice setting, demonstrated by
incongruencies between strategic and non-strategic choices in trust-dictator games.
Second, I find that, although consistent with the previous literature on false consensus, a mere
correlation of choices with beliefs falls short of capturing all the belief heterogeneity. Between two
people who both favor the same option, the one who has a stronger preference for it also has a
higher expectation that others will choose the same option. This novel finding is consistent with
the idea that people think others have underlying preferences similar to their own. Moreover, I find
that people not only assume similarity in the degree of concern for others overall but also assume
similarity in the degree of concern withdrawal that results from having less rather than having more
payoff than the other person. I also show that people demonstrate sensitivity to the differences
in the context between themselves and others when forming beliefs about others’ actions. In an
interaction between Person A and B, where Person A has a higher payoff than Person B, Person
A’s beliefs about the choice of Person B is influenced by Person A’s degree of altruism when he has
the lower payoff, and not by his degree of altruism in his current position.
Third, I show that deviations from mean beliefs are note solely person-specific. If each subject
stated her beliefs about others’ choices (or acted on these beliefs) in only one decision task, as
often is the case in the experimental studies of false consensus, discerning whether people have
individual-level relative pessimism or optimism or whether their relative pessimism or optimism
depends on their valuations of the choice options would be impossible. For example, those who have
a higher concern for others might also be more optimistic people, resulting in a spurious person-
specific relationship between beliefs and preferences. Using within-person variation in beliefs, I
am able to present novel evidence that deviations from mean beliefs are not person-specific. As
a person’s utility difference between the choice options varies across decision tasks, so does his
relative pessimism or optimism compared with the population.
Impact of belief heterogeneity on strategic actions and inference
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The second set of findings expose the pattern that the relationship between preferences and
beliefs creates in strategic actions, and its consequences for preference identification from these
actions.
I show that if the assumption of mutual consistency is maintained, people’s strategic actions in
trust-dictator games imply preferences that are inconsistent with the preferences that their actions
in dictator games reveal. In particular, differences between individuals regarding their trust of
others are opposite of those we would expect if we assume individuals are best responding to
homogenous expectations. I show that these results are congruent with differences in expectations of
altruism resulting from putting one’s self in the other’s shoes, so to speak. In the same application,
I provide evidence of the degree and direction of bias in the preference distribution estimates.
Knowing the nature of the relationship between preferences and expectations about others in
strategic interactions is important in determining the necessary data and proper econometric model
for the identification of preferences from a particular dataset of strategic actions. Even when beliefs
are elicited, if beliefs and preferences are correlated, then this correlation may need to be modeled
for correct inference. The way the researcher models this correlation has implications for achieving
unbiased estimates.
To my knowledge, the only empirical paper in the literature that allows for a correlation of
preferences and expectations about others’ actions is Bellemare et al. (2008). However, their aim
and approach in doing so are very different, as they are motivated by the need to control for a
potential spurious correlation between the two to avoid an endogeneity bias. In particular, they
addresses the identification of inequity averse preferences from choices in ultimatum games by
collecting proposers’ expectations of respondents’ reactions. They distinguish between preferences
when the person has more versus less payoff than the other and assume that respondents’ and
proposers’ preferences regarding social allocations come from the same distribution. Distribution
of preferences is estimated by a model that incorporates respondents’ and proposers’ actions in an
ultimatum game and proposers’ subjective expectations. The authors note the endogeneity bias
in the estimates of preference parameters that may result from a potential spurious correlation
of preferences and beliefs, for example, due to people with certain preferences also being more
optimistic. Therefore, they allow for a direct correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences and the unobserved heterogeneity in beliefs. They find a strong correlation between
5
optimism and inequity aversion.
The results of my paper show that the relationship between preferences and beliefs produce
differences in beliefs that are more than person-specific, and imply that the form of correlation
modeled in Bellemare et al (2002) is incomplete, potentially failing to account for the simultaneity
bias. Their assumption that correlation is spurious results in the modeling feature that a proposer’s
expectations about responders’ choices are similarly optimistic, regardless of whether the responder
has less or more payoff, as unobserved heterogeneity in beliefs are solely person-specific. However,
my results imply, for example, that a proposer might be relatively more optimistic (compared to
other proposers) when the responder has less payoff than him versus when he has more, if the
person himself is not sensitive (while other proposers are) to having more or less. While signifi-
cant person-specific correlations as Bellemare et al. (2008) report are a result of the relationship
between preferences and beliefs I document in this paper, they are insufficient to account for it. In
order to fully account for the correlation of preferences and beliefs, researchers should model their
relationship at the individual- and game-specific level, by allowing beliefs to depend on how the
individual values the options others are considering in that game.
Next, I provide an overview of the modified dictator games employed in this paper and discuss
the model and estimation of altruistic preferences, as all the studies share these building blocks. In
the following sections, I focus on the novel contributions of the paper. I detail the design and goal
of each study, and explain the findings. I conclude with a discussion and implications for future
research.
2 Review of Estimating the Degree of Concern for Others
2.1 Altruistic Preferences
In this paper, I define altruism as the non-strategic willingness to sacrifice one’s own payoff due to a
regard for another person’s payoff. In a simple model, as Charness and Rabin (2002) proposed, the
non-negative weight an individual puts on another person’s payoff relative to his own can capture
the degree of altruism. For people who are purely self-interested, this weight is zero. The variation
in this relative weight can summarize differences in the regard for others. Moreover, people may be
sensitive to relative position, positing far greater concern for those who have less than themselves
6
(behind) than those who have more (ahead). People may also be heterogeneous in the degree
of concern withdrawal due to relative position. I describe the utility a person gets from a social
allocation as a function of individual payoffs
ui(xi, xj) = (1(xi ≥ xj))[(1− αi)xi + αixj ] + (1(xj > xi))[(1− βi)xi + βixj ] (1)
where individual i’s utility is a weighted sum of her own payoff and the payoff of individual j. If
a person is ahead, α captures her degree of altruism, and if she is behind, β captures it. If the
person is purely self-interested then αi = βi = 0. Although some people do not exhibit a positive
regard for others, we may expect others sacrificing to help others, more so at cheaper helping
prices, especially when they are ahead. Person-specific altruism parameters, αi and βi, can be
inferred from individuals’ choices in social allocation tasks that vary in the individual-sacrifice to
social-benefit tradeoff. Experimental studies commonly use social allocation decisions in modified
dictator games to measure individual differences in the degree of altruism (Charness and Rabin
(2002), Fisman et al.( 2007)).
2.2 Modified Dictator Games
In all the studies to follow, I infer an individual’s degree of altruism from his choices across several
modified dictator games. This section explains the structure of the modified dictator games used
in this paper.





j). Person i makes a social allocation choice that determines his payoff xi as well as the
payoff of another person xj . Person j (recipient) gets paid according to the person i’s (dictator’s)
decision. The lack of the recipient’s decision power makes this game a non-strategic choice task for
the dictator.
In each game, one of the options pays the dictator more, but is socially inefficient. The other
option involves a sacrifice from the dictator but yields a social benefit. Let the two social allocation
options be denoted with subscripts L and R. For parsimony of exposition, assume option L pays
the dictator more than option R, xli > x
r
i . Then option R pays the recipient more than option L,
xrj > x
l
j and the dictator’s sacrifice is smaller than the recipient’s gain
2, xrj − xlj > xli − xri . So by
2In all the games in this paper, the dictator’s sacrifice increases the social welfare since I am only interested in
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picking the option that pays him less (R), the dictator can increase the payment to the recipient by
more than the amount he sacrifices. Therefore, choice of this option is social welfare maximizing.













j . Figure 1 illustrates a sample game.
Figure 1: Example of a modified dictator game.
A participant makes decisions across multiple games that vary in the ratio of the dictator’s
potential sacrifice to the recipient’s potential benefit. Given the choice between two options, person
i will choose the option that pays him more (L) if the tradeoff between the sacrifice required and the
increase in social welfare is larger than his willingness to sacrifice. If the dictator is ahead, xli > x
l
j
and xri > x
r
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the person will choose the option that provides lower social welfare but higher personal payoff. By
observing an individual’s choices as Q changes, we can infer his degree of concern for others when
ahead and when behind.
Tables 2, 3, 4, 9, and 14 list the set of modified dictator games subjects faced in each study and
the percentage of the subjects who picked the option that paid them more (i.e., the selfish choice).
These tables highlight general tendencies among the subjects regarding social allocation choices.
As expected, subjects were more likely to be selfish when the options offered more to the recipient
eliciting heterogeneity in altruism and beliefs about others’ willingness to make welfare-increasing sacrifices. If the
goal were to determine the distribution of types of social preferences in the population as in Fisman et al. (2007)
then determining whether a person who does not engage in any social-welfare increasing behavior would choose to
engage in pareto-damaging behavior would be of interest. In that case, inclusion of pareto-damaging sacrifice options
would help discern whether α or β are zero or negative. Given both the more specific objective of using variation
in altruistic preferences as an application to study beliefs about others and the previous finding that most people
do not engage in pareto-damaging actions (Charness and Rabin (2002)), I choose to focus on the degree of positive
altruism. The inability to distinguish between whether a person is only self-interested or would sacrifice to damage
social welfare only decreases the observed variation in preferences and potentially leads to an underestimation of the
documented correlation between preferences and beliefs.
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(when the dictator was behind) and when their sacrifice did not translate to a large increase in the
recipient’s allocation.
2.3 Inference of Altruism Parameters from Choices in Modified Dictator Games
I estimate a subject’s degree of altruism from his choices in several dictator games assuming observed
behavior corresponds to individuals implementing the preferences formulated in Equation 1 with
error3. The decision maker is allowed to potentially choose randomly in some games and thus pick
the utility-maximizing option with some probability less than one. Therefore, the error reflects a
random mistake, and the person is equally likely to make a mistake in each dictator game. Then
the likelihood of the individual picking option L over option R can be written as
Pr(y = l) = 1(ui(xli, x
l




This approach rationalizes observed inconsistencies in the same way regardless of where the
intransitivity occurs, and it may even result in set identification, where two preference parameters
are equally likely. In a context with sparse discrete choice data, this approach is behaviorally and
informationally more compelling than letting the likelihood of the error be a function of the utility
cost of an error4. I apply this formulation to the choices made in dictator games to estimate subject
specific αi, βi, and ωi.
Appendix A2 displays individual-specific parameter estimates5. The reader will note the het-
3A simpler approach to characterizing differences in the degree of altruism across people is to rank them by the
number of altruistic choices they made across the dictator games they faced, either as ahead or as behind. However,
this approach does not distinguish between a person who is consistently middle of the road in his degree of altruism
and a person who is just choosing randomly. In addition, this approach cannot predict what the person would choose
given a novel dictator game. Therefore, I find it necessary and useful to work with a specific utility formulation.
4An example of modeling the error as a function of the utility cost is the logit regression. A unique preference
parameter minimizes the individual’s total error. In estimating population mean preference parameters for aggregate
data, Charness and Rabin (2002) use this approach. Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), on the other hand,
employ uniform errors, as in this application. The results of the paper are not sensitive to how the error term is
modeled, and the replication of results using a logit formulation are available upon request.
5As each individual makes decisions in dictator games with two choice options, the preference parameters are
identified up to the ranges that discrete questions divide the space. I can only determine whether an individual-
specific preference parameter falls in the ranges of [0, .111], [.112, .143], [.144, .2],[.201, .25],[.251, .334],[.335, .4],[.401,
.429],[.43, .5], depending on the set of questions asked. Therefore, to capture the observed heterogeneity among
subjects, I assign parameters close to the minimum of these ranges, 0, .12, .15, .21, .26, .34, .41, .44, to avoid
overestimating altruism. My later results about the relationship between preferences and beliefs are not sensitive
to this choice. Moreover, I only use choices in modified dictator games that do not have zero or equal outcomes to
estimate these preferences, as I find a sensitivity to these characteristics, yet do not want to complicate the utility
model beyond what Charness and Rabin (2002) propose for this application. As long as estimated preferences can
help infer how people evaluate options that others are considering, then this restriction does not influence my results.
9
erogeneity of preferences in the degree of regard for others when dictators are ahead or behind.
The difference between the two parameters also varies greatly. Table 1 displays the joint frequency
of αi and βi for those individuals who made decisions in both relative positions (ahead and behind)
in Studies 1 and 3. We see that, in general, people show a withdrawal of concern for others when
the game offers them less (behind) and others more, whereas the degree of the impact of relative
position varies across people.
The specification of the altruistic utility function and the estimation of the individual altruism
parameters αi and βi are in line with previous research. This paper does not aim to test between
different models of social preferences and only focuses on positive altruism. Estimating the differ-
ences across people in their regard for others is the main goal, as this heterogeneity is essential
to studying the relationship between individuals’ preferences and beliefs about others’ actions in
similar contexts. The previous evidence on the heterogeneity in these preferences and the need to
separate strategic kindness from true altruism in social interactions motivate the particular focus
on altruistic preferences.
3 Studies and Results.
3.1 Study 1.
In this study, subjects first made choices in modified dictator games and then expressed their beliefs
about other participants’ choices. I designed the study to document the form of the correlation
between beliefs about others’ choices and the individual’s own preferences that determine such
choices. The main structure of the study allows me to draw a parallel with the findings in the false
consensus literature. I also include new controls and an incentive-based belief elicitation method
in order to bolster the generality of the findings. Most importantly, I augmented the design to be
able to test new hypotheses regarding the nature of the correlation of interest.
Therefore, I also only study beliefs about others’ choices in modified dictator games that do not have zero or equal
outcomes.
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3.1.1 Procedures and Design
One hundred and two undergraduate and graduate students participated as decision makers in this
study6 across three sessions of 24, 48, and 30. The experimenter informed the decision makers
that the study had two parts and that their decisions in both would affect the payment they would
receive in addition to the flat rate of $6 for their 30-minute participation. All payments were
determined and made at the end of the experiment.
Decision makers read instructions detailing the nature of the decision tasks in the first part,
how their choices determined both their payment and that of an anonymous recipient, that the
computer would pick one decision task from the first part at random to determine payments, and
how these payments would be made to ensure anonymity. The instructions also emphasized that
decision makers were randomly and anonymously matched to a different recipient for each game, to
eliminate potential dynamics in behaviors in a repeated interaction. These instructions, along with
examples of the presentation of decision tasks can be found in Appendix A1.1. After participants
read all the instructions, they were presented consecutively with several modified dictator games
after the instructions. In each game, they had to choose between two social-allocation options. The
games varied in the ratio of the dictator’s potential sacrifice to the recipient’s potential benefit.
Some subjects made decisions only in games that paid them more than the recipient in both social
allocation options, whereas some also faced games that paid them less than the recipient in both
social allocation options.
After decision makers completed the first part, additional instructions informed them about the
nature of questions in the second part and that their additional payment included a reward based
on the accuracy of the subject’s estimate of others’ actions in the randomly picked question from
this part. For each dictator game in this part, participants predicted the likelihood of each option
being picked by the dictators in the experiment. Some subjects only made guesses about others’
behavior in games they had faced themselves as decision tasks in the first part, some subjects only
made guesses about games they have not faced before, and some made guesses about a mixture of
6Another 72 students participated as recipients in session 1 and 2 and had no decisions to make regarding inter-
actions with dictators. In sessions 1 and 2, a coin toss determined whether the participant was assigned the role of
the dictator. Participants in these sessions who did not make decisions in modified dictator games spent their time
reading instructions about the specifics of dictator games and then answering an unrelated survey for 30 minutes
in another room before receiving a flat fee for their participation along with the amount that a randomly matched
dictator allocated to them. In session 3, all participants were in the same room and played alternating roles.
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both.
The study consisted of three different sessions sharing the same basic design with different
robustness controls. Appendix A1.1 includes all the procedures and design details. Sessions varied
in the form of accuracy incentives used, whether the recipients were in the same room, whether the
total population of other decision makers was visible, whether the relative position of the dictator
was varied, and whether the expectations were measured as percentages or frequencies. Some
sessions counterbalanced the order of options in modified dictator games and the order of questions.
None of these robustness controls had any impact on the results, supporting the generality of the
findings.
3.1.2 Preliminary Results
In Tables 2-4, I document the dictator games in all three sessions of Study 1 for which subjects
were asked to state their beliefs. The tables include information on the percentage of the subjects
that picked the selfish option over the social-welfare-maximizing option and the average beliefs
regarding the percentage of others who would pick the selfish option. Tables 2 and 3 also compare
average beliefs across subjects who made different choices in a game7.
From these averages, we can identify three main patterns. The first is that subjects correctly
recognize that fewer people are selfish when the tradeoff of sacrifice to social benefit is low. The
second is a considerable amount of conservatism; beliefs are biased toward the uniform prior. The
third is that substantial differences in subject’s beliefs exist, depending on the subject’s behavior
in that game (β = 0.33, t = 6.87). In fact, the third pattern is congruent with what the false
consensus literature has documented across many domains (for a review, see Marks and Miller
(1987)). Direct elicitation of beliefs in Study 1 allows me to draw this parallel between my data
and what the false consensus literature has documented. In addition, I document this pattern with
monetary incentives for accuracy. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2009) independently provide additional
evidence for the correlation of dictators’ choices and beliefs about other dictators’ actions using
accuracy incentives. While the first study in that working paper and Study 1 in this paper elicit
7In cases where the subjects had made a choice in that dictator game in part 1, their actual choices from part 1
help split the data. If the subjects had not seen the games then their predicted choices are used to split the data. I
predict their choices by using their invidual preference parameters α and β estimated from their choices in part 1.
In session 1, all of the belief questions were presented in Part 1, whereas in session 2, only some were. In session 3,
none of the beliefs questions were presented in Part 1.
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similar data from subjects, the two papers diverge in their research question, analysis and other
studies.
3.1.3 Discussion of Results and Motivation for Further Analyses
These results provide additional support for systematic differences in beliefs as a function of own
choice, which is a clear violation of the assumption of mutual consistency. As previously debated
(Hoch 1987, Dawes 1989, Krueger and Clement 1994), this systematic correlation may result from
egocentrism or from informational differences across subjects. Whatever its origin, such systematic
differences in beliefs stand in the way of inferring preference from choice under uncertainty. For
example, if relatively selfish dictators believe more of the population is selfish than altruistic dicta-
tors do, their willingness to defer to others in a trust-dictator game that involves social allocations
(as I study in Study 3) will be low, not only because they are less altruistic, but also because they
don’t trust others to be altruistic. Therefore, we cannot ascribe differences across people in their
behavior to differences in their preferences alone.
These systematic belief differences may further complicate the econometric inference problem.
If beliefs are not orthogonal to choices (nor, as I will show, to preferences) then not only would the
econometrician want to collect data on beliefs, but she might also need to model this correlation
appropriately to avoid biases resulting from endogeneity (Bellemare et al. (2008)). In order to
understand the nature of this correlation with the aim of incorporating it into an appropriate
econometric model, I ask the following three questions: (1) Does the act of having made a choice
matter? In many situations, people form expectations about others’ decisions without having faced
the exact decision themselves. If the person (and the econometrician) can predict what he would
choose in that situation, does this predicted action influence beliefs in the same way? (2) Do
differences in subjects’ choices fully capture the systematic differences in beliefs? Consider two
people with the same observed choice in a given dictator game. According to the previous findings
in the false consensus literature, their opinions should be similarly skewed toward expecting a
higher percentage of others to make this same choice. However, two people making the same
choice could have different preference parameters. As a result, one could have a small utility
difference between the two options in the dictator game, whereas the other could have a large one.
If preferences instead of choices alone affect beliefs, the person who is almost indifferent between
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the options and the person who strongly favors his choice may have systematically different beliefs
about others’ choices in the same context. (3) Are differences in beliefs person-specific alone? A
person might be pessimistic about others’ altruism regardless of how he evaluates the options in
the given context, which means the person’s relative pessimism is person-specific8. Alternatively,
the relative pessimism of the person can depend on his evaluations and therefore potentially change
across contexts.
To answer these questions, I move the focus of the analysis from choices to the underlying
preferences to capture the heterogeneity in beliefs. I make use of the individual specific αi and βi,
estimated from choices in modified dictator games9, both in constructing what the subject would
most likely choose in a new game and in capturing differences of preference intensity among subjects
with the same discrete choice. Using individual preference estimates to quantify the differences in
option evaluations across contexts for a given person helps answer whether the relationship between
preferences and beliefs are person-specific alone.
3.1.4 Model and Empirical Analysis
I model an individual’s beliefs about others’ choices to vary with how he evaluates the choice others
face. To capture the false consensus effect I documented above, I allow one’s choice to affect her
beliefs about others’ choices in that same game. I also allow beliefs about actions in a game the
individual has not faced to potentially depend on what she would choose in that game, given her
estimated preferences. Over and beyond the effect of actual or potential choice, I also consider
additional heterogeneity due to a finer classification of individuals, by their preference. To this
end, I allow for the potential of individuals’ guesses about others’ choice probabilities to depend on
how far from making each particular choice they see themselves.
The resulting basic model of person i’s beliefs about the proportion of people picking the selfish
option (say L) in dictator game k is
8This outcome may potentially result from a spurious correlation, such as selfish people being more pessimistic in
general.
9When the parameters can take on more than one value, I use the smallest. None of the results are sensitive to
this choice; robustness checks are available upon request.
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The game-specific means, µk, capture variations in expected probabilities across games, such
as the fact that the expectation of observing an altruistic choice should decrease with the sacrifice
required, as well as other factors that deviate from objective probabilities, such as general pessimism
or conservatism10. Given these game-specific controls and an i.i.d. error term εik, the assumption
of mutual consistency rules out further differences.
The remaining terms allow for additional systematic differences as a function of the individual’s
preferences. In games where the dictator is ahead, xl,rik > x
l,r
jk , the altruism parameter αi determines
evaluations of options and consequently the choice. If the degree of altruism, αi, is less than the
cutoff, Qk, then the individual chooses the selfish option providing lower social welfare. Similarly,
if the dictator is behind, βi governs evaluations of options. Therefore, given estimates of αi and βi,
even if the subject has not made a choice in game k himself, we can determine which choice person
i’s preferences would lead him to.
The effect of one’s own discrete choice (observed or predicted) in game k on one’s belief about
others’ choices in game k is captured by ρ. The parameter δ, on the other hand, investigates further
systematic belief differences among individuals with the same choice but different preferences. The
larger the difference between the preference parameter and the cutoff, the larger the utility difference
between choosing the selfish versus the altruistic option. If people assume a similarity between their
underlying preferences that shaped their choice and the preferences of others, then we would expect
that between two people who made the same choice, the person with the larger utility difference
between options is more likely to believe more people chose the option he prefers. Therefore, we
10Please see Appendix A3.1 for results on mean-beliefs inaccuracy results. I find considerable conservatism but
no support for a common pessimism about altruism in the population. I also discuss the impact of systematic
heterogeneity in beliefs on the measurement and interpretation of common inaccuracy effects such as conservatism
and pessimism.
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expect δ to be positive.
While estimating this basic model, I take into account the fact that reported beliefs are between
zero and one with a censored regression.
Bik =

0 if B∗ik < 0;
B∗ik if 1 ≥ B∗ik ≥ 0;
1 if B∗ik > 1.
The assumption that the errors εik are distributed normally produces a two-limit tobit model,
guaranteeing the reported beliefs are between 0 and 1. I treat the preferences parameters αi and
βi as data in the estimation of beliefs.
In the empirical analysis, I extend this basic model to allow for further interactions of interest.
For example, I observe two individual characteristics, gender and area of study. I use these to
test for differences in mean beliefs and in the degree of preference and belief correlation subjects
display. Since economics majors should have more experience with modified dictator games, they
should display lower levels of correlation between own choice and expectations of others’ choices,
per the informational argument of Dawes (1989). They may also be more pessimistic on average
about altruism in the population. I do not have any reason to expect gender to be a significant
factor.
Another person-specific factor that may influence the degree of correlation between preferences
and beliefs is ωi, obtained from the estimation of individual preference parameters. The more
the number of choices the subject made that were irreconcilable with the underlying preference
parameter estimated, the higher this parameter. I do not expect this factor to influence mean
beliefs. The effect of this parameter on the degree of correlation between preferences and beliefs is
unclear. If we interpret ωi as capturing carelessness, take the view that the relationship between
preferences and beliefs result from an egocentric bias (projection), and assume careful deliberation
leads to seeing different ways others can react, we would expect a positive effect of ωi, as we expect
those who are more careful to project less. On the other hand, if we interpret ωi as diffuseness of
preferences then we can expect people with more certain preferences to have a stronger correlation
between their preferences and what they think others will do.
Finally, I allow the act of having made a choice to influence the correlation between preferences
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and beliefs. If having made a choice in a decision task makes one’s choice more salient then we
expect the correlation between beliefs and these actions to be stronger. I need to use within-person
variation in whether the participant faced the task in Part 1 to identify this effect. Therefore, only
session 2 provides suitable data to test the hypothesis.
3.1.5 Results
Given individual preference estimates, I can predict subjects’ choices in new games. Tables 3 and
4 compare average beliefs across subjects who sare predicted to make different choices in a game,
based on their αi’s and βi’s. The raw data present a similar pattern of belief differences based on
predicted choices compared with the differences based on actual choices.
Table 5 presents the results for the tobit regression of beliefs using data from all three sessions11.
The differences across subjects’ own choices in the raw data suggest that considerable heterogeneity
exists in beliefs about others’ propensity to pick the selfish option. Column 1 documents that, on
average, a subject who picks the selfish option estimates the percentage of others who would pick
the selfish option to be 28.4 percent higher than would a subject who picks the altruistic option.
Table 6 displays the results of this first regression across each session in the study. The results
across these sessions suggest that this evidence for projection is not sensitive to the robustness
check differences12.
Column 2 in Table 5 documents the effect of underlying preferences on beliefs over and beyond
the effect of one’s own choice. The larger the difference between Q (the cutoff in the question) and
the degree of one’s altruism, the further the subject’s evaluations are from making an altruistic
choice, and I find the higher the estimated percentage of selfish actions. Importantly, this result pro-
vides the first evidence in the literature that differences in choice do not capture all the systematic
variation in beliefs. Differences in the strength of preference introduce further heterogeneity.
If beliefs vary with preferences and not just choice, the systematic heterogeneity has a bigger
11In all the analyses, I drop subjects whose parameters are estimated with ωi (propensity to choose randomly in
dictator games) more than 40% in order to have reliable predictions about the options they would have picked in
new games given their preferences. As a result, I drop 15 out of 102 participants (3 subjects from session 1, 11 from
session 2, and 1 from session 3) while preserving a considerable amount of variation in ωi. I also do not include
beliefs about choices in modified dictator games with zero or equal outcomes to preserve consistency across sessions
in this study and in other studies, and to keep the utility model simple, as aversion to zero is another heterogenous
preference parameter. My results are not sensitive to any of these exclusions and robustness checks are available
upon request.
12All other findings are also congruent across sessions and replication is avoided for brevity.
17
individual-specific component. However, note that the above proposed model does not imply that
all heterogeneity is individual-specific; the person’s relatively high beliefs about the selfish option
being chosen, compared to objective probabilities, decrease for questions in which she is more likely
to make an altruistic choice. For example, if a person has a relatively high αi but a relatively low
βi then in games where the dictator is ahead, she will be less pessimistic compared to others than
in games where the dictator is behind.
Note, however, that a significant ρ in the first regression can well be a result of individual-
specific differences in pessimism about others’ altruism regardless of how individuals evaluate the
options in a given context. This outcome may potentially result from a spurious correlation, such as
selfish people being more pessimistic in general. In fact, the canonical experimental false consensus
studies are subject to this concern, as they usually only ask one belief question per person regarding
the same context. However, I ask subjects to report expectations across many games, and therefore
I can test this hypothesis by including subject fixed effects to control for individuals’ mean level of
deviation from the population average beliefs, µk’s, across games.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 document that these systematic individual differences are not
merely individual differences in pessimism across people, as the effect remains significant even after
subject fixed effects are included. This result suggests person i’s relative deviation from game-
specific belief averages µk changes as his evaluation of the options change. This finding is at odds
with the specification Bellemare et al. (2008) use to control for the correlation of beliefs and
preferences. They model differences in beliefs to be person-specific and not to have a decision-
context-specific component. Yet the current results show that a direct correlation of preferences
and the level of individual-specific pessimism will not suffice.
Given that subjects do not display the same level of optimism or pessimism across different
modified dictator games in general, I now test whether people who have high concern withdrawal
due to relative position (large αi − βi difference) also think that others will display high concern
withdrawal13 . Regardless of a people’s individual tendencies to be pessimistic or optimistic, if
they project their concern withdrawal onto others, we expect those with higher levels of concern
withdrawal to display a bigger difference in their beliefs of altruism of other dictators in games
where the dictator is ahead versus behind. Table 7 reports the results of a tobit regression of
13Only subjects in session 3 faced dictator games in both positions.
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beliefs on the interaction of whether the dictator is ahead in the dictator game and the αi − βi
difference of the subject, controlling for subject specific and game specific averages. To expose
the general differences in beliefs due to the relative position of the dictator and of those who have
more sensitivity to relative position, column 2 displays the results of a regression without subject
and game controls. We see that the bigger the concern withdrawal of the subject, the more he
thinks that the dictators will be less selfish when ahead than when behind. In sum, within-person
differences in beliefs reflect that subjects think others are similar to themselves in the sensitivity
to relative position.
Turning to testing for differences in the degree of the correlation between preferences and beliefs,
I first test if whether the subjects made a choice in the decision task before increases the correlation
of preferences and beliefs. Session 2 provides within-subject variation in this regard, as subjects
see a mixture of new tasks and tasks in which they have made choices. I include a mean control





jk)[1(αi < Qk)ρ(1 + ν11(newik = 0)) + (Qk − αi)δ(1 + ν21(newik = 0))]
+ 1(xl,rik < x
l,r
jk)[1(βi < Qk)ρ(1 + ν11(newik = 0)) + (Qk − βi)δ(1 + ν21(newik = 0))]
+ ν31(newik = 0) + µk + εik
where 1(newik = 0) indicates person i had faced game k as a decision task in Part 1.
Column 1 in Table 8 shows that subjects do not display a higher or a lower correlation between
their choices and their beliefs if they made a choice in the task before as a dictator. Neither do
they have different mean beliefs. Column 2 in this table replicates column 2 of Table 5 for session
2, and column 3 shows no impact of having faced the task on the relationship between beliefs and
preference intensity. Therefore, I conclude that subjects’ predicted choices relate to their beliefs in
the same way their actual choices would. This evidence suggests subjects’ commitment (or absence
thereof) to a specific choice has no impact on their beliefs about the choices of others, which means
researchers do not have to collect choice data in the same contexts as the ones in which beliefs are
elicited; knowledge of the relevant individual preference estimates would suffice.
I also test whether person-specific observables such as gender, area of study, or error-proneness
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in modified dictator choice tasks (ωi) capture any heterogeneity in the level of correlation between
preferences and beliefs. Gender and area of study do not have any effect on the degree of correlation
between beliefs and preferences. However, I find that the people who are more consistent in their
choices in Part 1 project these choices more strongly onto others. Table 9 demonstrates this finding,
providing evidence against the hypothesis that increased deliberation decreases projection.
These results provide evidence for a correlation structure between preferences and beliefs that
extends the correlation of choices and beliefs, and that adds to allowing for mere differences across
subjects. Being aware of not just the existence but also the structure of this correlation informs
both the type of data researchers need to collect to identify preferences and the type of model
required to relate the data.
3.2 Study 2.
The goal of Study 1 was to document the existence and form of the correlation between preferences
and beliefs. To this end, I elicited beliefs about others’ choices in different decision contexts,
consistent with the previous literature on false consensus and expectation measurement (Manski
2004).
The aim of Study 2 is to present additional evidence on the nature of the correlation between
one’s degree of altruism and one’s beliefs about others’ altruism without directly asking them about
their beliefs. I do so by relating participants’ altruistic preferences to their risk-taking behavior in
gambles on others’ altruism. As in Study 1, I inferred individuals’ altruistic preferences from their
actions in modified dictator games; however, instead of guessing about others’ behaviors, subjects
made risky decisions involving their beliefs about others’ behaviors. These decisions involved a
choice between a sure payoff and a risky option that paid what a random previous dictator allocated
to a recipient in a given modified dictator game. Figure 2 illustrates an example of such a decision
task.
The participants risked earning less money than the sure payoff if the dictator chose the option
that paid the dictator more, and they stood to earn more money if the dictator chose altruistically
instead. Therefore, the higher the subject’s expectations are about altruistic behavior in the given
game, the greater his expected utility from taking the gamble. Subjects’ decisions only influenced
their own payoff, and therefore concern for others did not influence their decisions. However, given
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Figure 2: Example of a gamble on others’ altruism.
the evidence of the relationship of beliefs about others’ altruistic actions and own preferences from
Study 1, I also expected systematic differences in the willingness to take a gamble in which these
beliefs play a role.
3.2.1 Design and Procedures
Departing from Study 1, Study 2 controlled for the sequence of elicitation. It consisted of two
seemingly independent experiments run two weeks apart with the same panel of subjects. The
order of the experiments was counterbalanced. Among the 51 subjects who took part in both
experiments, 23 participated in Experiment B first, in which they made decisions involving gambles
on altruism, and 28 participated in Experiment A first, in which they made decisions in modified
dictator games. I allowed only those students who had not participated in Study 1 to participate
in this study.
In Experiment A, subjects were presented with 16 modified dictator games drawn from those
presented in Study 1, Session 3. The games were divided into two different sets of eight. Each
subject played the role of the dictator for one set of games and played the role of the recipient for
the other set. Games from each set were interspersed. Each set included four games where the
dictator was behind and four where he was ahead. For each relative position, the sets presented
the following ratios between the dictator’s sacrifice to the recipient’s benefit: {1/8, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2}.
Games presented the payments in tokens, where 100 tokens equaled $1. Table 10 presents these
games and average behavior statistics.
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At the end of Experiment A, the experimenter picked one modified dictator game at random
to finalize payments. Subjects were paid according to their role in that game. If they were a
dictator, their decision determined their payment. If they were a recipient, the dictator’s decision
determined their payment. Each dictator was randomly and anonymously matched to a different
recipient for each game. Experiment A paid $16.17 on average for participation and the additional
payments resulting from decisions made in the experiment.
Experiment B consisted of three parts. Part 1 asked subjects to first make risky decisions
involving picking between a sure outcome and a gamble with known probabilities, where the sure
outcome was titrated between the minimum and the maximum payoff of the gamble in $0.25
increments. The gambles were [33%, $6.00; 67%, $2.00], [60%, $7.50; 40%, $3.50], [75%, $4.50;
25%, $1.50] and [20%, $6.50; 80%, $2.00]. After Part 1 was collected, Part 2 presented four risky
choices between a sure payoff and one of the gambles above, to check for consistency. Part 2
continued with detailed explanations and instructions about decisions involving a sure payoff and
a gamble on a random past participant’s decision in a modified dictator game. Appendix A1.2
contains these instructions and further details.
After reading the instructions, subjects made risky decisions involving picking between a sure
outcome and what a past dictator allocated to a recipient in the particular modified dictator game,
as Figure 2 depicts. The participants were told that the past experiment took place in the same
lab with a random selection of students from the same subject pool. The instructions informed
the participants that the dictator had chosen an option in the past without knowing the existence
of the decision task the participant faced today. Moreover, the instructions clarified that the
participants’ decision between the sure payoff and the risky option would not influence the payoffs
of any participants in the current or the past experiment. Thus their decisions depended on their
subjective beliefs about dictators’ choices in the specific modified dictator game and not on their
degree of concern for others.
Experiment B included four dictator games (two ahead / two behind) from each set of eight
in Experiment A, ensuring that each participant had seen (or was going to see) all the games in
Experiment B but acted (or was going to act) as a dictator in only half of them in Experiment A.
For each of the eight modified dictator games in Experiment B, several risky decision tasks were
presented where the sure outcome was titrated between the minimum and the maximum payoff the
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dictator could give to the recipient in $0.25 increments. After Part 2 was collected, Part 3 presented
the same modified dictator games in a different order and asked the subjects to choose between a
sure outcome and what the dictator allocated to the recipient in that game. Table 10 displays the
average certainty equivalents and entry behavior for the games presented in Experiment B.
The consent form informed subjects they would receive $6.00 for their participation at the end
of the experiment and an additional payment between $1.50 and $7.50 depending on their decisions
and the outcome of the randomly picked gamble. If the subject chose the gamble over the sure
payment, the objective probability of each event and a random number generator determined the
outcome for each individual. The percentage of choices of dictators who participated in Study 1,
Session 3 and a random number generator determined the outcome for gambles involving modified
dictator games. The average payment was $10.47.
3.2.2 Analyses and Results
Given subjects’ risky choices across the titration of sure payoffs in $0.25 increments for each gam-
ble, I can infer the certainty equivalent for that gamble for any individual (up to the increments)
using the point where the subject switches his choice from the sure payoff to the gamble. Sum-
mary statistics in Table 10 include average behavior in modified dictator games, average certainty
equivalents for gambles based on these games14, and frequency of choosing to gamble at a given
sure payoff. Average entry behavior is consistent with the average certainty equivalents (CE). If
the sure payoff is above the average CE then entry is lower; if the sure payoff is below the average
CE then entry is higher. When the sure payoff is close to the average CE about half the subjects
enter.
Note that if the dictator chooses selfishly in the game presented in the gamble, the subject
gets less than if he would have chosen the sure payoff. Conversely, if the dictator sacrifices for the
benefit of the recipient, then the subject gets more than the sure payoff. Therefore, the higher
the subject’s expectations are about altruistic behavior in the given game, the greater his expected
utility from taking the gamble. Therefore, each gamble presents a risky decision task in which the
subject needs to make a decision based on his level of trust in others’ altruism in the particular
modified dictator game.
14I take the certainty equivalent to be the minimum of the $0.25 range for the calculations in this table.
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Given subjects’ own choices in modified dictator games in Experiment A, I either observe what
the subject personally would choose in the game presented in the gamble, or I can predict his choice
based on his estimated preferences, as in Study 1. The last two columns of Table 10 summarize
subjects’ entry behavior and CEs based on their observed or implied personal choices in the shoes
of the dictator.
We see the subject is more likely to choose the gamble over the sure payoff if he would have
chosen the welfare-maximizing option had he been in the shoes of the dictator. If he would have
chosen the selfish option, he is more likely to avoid the gamble and opt for the sure payoff. We also
see a parallel pattern in certainty equivalents. In gambles where the objective risk is moderate, the
difference in certainty equivalents between the two groups is more pronounced. However, the raw
data in certainty equivalents are less pronounced because when a gamble has a high expected value
due to low risk or a low expected value due to high risk, the difference across groups is depressed
due to truncation at one end.
By design, a subject’s choice between the gamble and the sure payoff does not affect any other
subject’s payoff. However, Table 10 suggests that subjects who are more concerned about others are
more likely to pick the gamble over the sure payoff. Therefore, we must conclude that either those
with more concern for others place a higher expected value on the gamble or that they like taking
on such gambles more than those with less concern for others. If risk preferences and the degree
of concern for others are not orthogonal then one cannot conclude that systematic differences in
entry decisions are due to systematic differences in beliefs that relate to differences in preferences.
To test for a correlation between social and risk preferences, I relate subjects’ choices in risky
decisions with known probabilities (Experiment B, Parts 1 and 2) to their choices in modified
dictator games. I describe each individual with two variables, his level of altruism when ahead
and when behind. Using a reduced form approach to avoid having to assume a specific form of
risk aversion, I test whether risk-taking behavior correlates with these variables in two different
ways. First, using the choices from Part 2, where the subjects were presented with only one sure
payoff for each of the four gambles, I examine whether a subject’s propensity to take the gamble
correlates with his altruism variables. Table 11 presents estimates from a probit model of binary
choice. Entry implies the subject took the gamble over the sure payoff. I model this decision to
depend on the degree of altruism when ahead, the degree of altruism when behind, and fixed effects
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for the different gambles. I do not find any evidence that differences in altruism explain differences
in risk-taking behavior. The second test uses entry decisions in the titration task for each gamble
imply (Experiment B, Part 1). Bearing in mind that the switching behavior (between choosing the
gamble versus the sure payoff) can only happen at a discrete number of titrations and that these
are ordered in value, I model the point at which the subject will switch (i.e. his CE) based on
his degree of altruism when ahead, his degree of altruism when behind, and fixed effects for the
different gambles, using an ordered probit. Table 12 presents the results. Differences in altruism
do not correlate with differences in certainty equivalents15.
Given that I find no evidence for a correlation of risk and social preferences, the inference is
greatly simplified, as the knowledge that these preferences are orthogonal allows me to study risk-
taking behavior in gambles on altruism without having to incorporate individual risk preferences16.
I use the decisions participants made in Part 3 of Experiment B and a reduced form approach
to model the propensity of taking a gamble on altruism over a sure payoff. Each subject made
eight decisions between a sure payoff and a gamble on altruism. Each gamble involved a different
modified dictator game. I use binary probit to model the decision to take the gamble as depending
on one’s own actual or inferred choice in the related dictator game. Column 1 of Table 13 presents
the results. The coefficient −0.51 translates to a marginal effect of 20% less propensity to take the
gamble if the participants’ social preferences would have led them to pick the selfish option had
they been in the shoes of the dictator. As in Study 1, I also examine the impact of preference
intensity, measured by the difference between the tradeoff Qk of the dictator game in the gamble
and the subject’s altruism parameter αi or βi, depending on the relative position of the dictator.
The larger the difference is, the higher the utility of the selfish option over the altruistic option for
the subject. Therefore, I expect preference intensity for the selfish option to decrease the propensity
to enter, as shown in column 2 of Table 13. However, since this study does not employ as wide
a range of tradeoffs for modified dictator games as Study 1, the results are significant but weaker
due to the lack of evidence of wide variation in the strength of preferences across subjects.
We can also ask whether the differences in gamble-taking behavior are due to other subject-
15In this regression, the certainty equivalents are discrete choices and only the difference matter rather than which
point in the range is picked as the specific certainty equivalent.
16An econometric model with a specific form of risk aversion can be estimated in order to incorporate individual
differences in risk preferences. Capturing the variation due to risk would decrease the noise and produce more precise
estimates for the impact of social preferences on implicit beliefs about others’ altruism. However, one must weigh
this benefit against having to rely on a specific risk-aversion formulation.
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specific unobservables. Some examples of such differences could be differences in risk aversion or
differences in general pessimism. Since we observe decisions of gamble-taking behavior within and
across subjects, we can add subject-specific controls. I report the results of including subject fixed
effects in column 3 of Table 13. I drop six subjects’ decisions, as the subjects do not vary over
the eight gambles in their decision to take the gamble. We see that all of the evidence for the
correlation between preferences and gamble-taking behavior comes from within-subject variations.
Note that this study alternated the sequence of preference elicitation and risky choices. Table
14 reports two tests of sensitivity. Columns 1 and 3 include the results of the main analysis (Table
13, column 1) repeated separately for the two conditions. In one condition, subjects participated
in Experiment A and then came back two weeks later to participate in Experiment B. In the other
condition, the sequence was reversed. We see the correlation between one’s choice and one’s beliefs
do not depend on whether he made choices in modified dictator games first or last. In the condition
where subjects participated in Experiment A first, we can ask whether having made a decision in
a previous dictator game changed the way in which own preferences affected beliefs. Column 2 of
Table 14 reports the results. As in Study 1, we see no such effect. For completeness, I repeat this
analysis for the other condition and report it in column 4. The fact that the subject faced a gamble
regarding a dictator game does not influence decisions in that game.
3.2.3 Summary and Discussion of Study 1 and Study 2 Results
The first two studies presented evidence that differences in beliefs elicited with accuracy incentives,
as well as differences in implicit beliefs operant in risky choices involving trust in others’ altruism,
are systematically related to differences in preferences. These systematic differences across peo-
ple violate the commonly held assumption of mutual consistency when inferring preferences from
choices made under uncertainty. Therefore, a careful documentation of the existence of these dif-
ferences, with robustness checks relating to the standards of several disciplines, is essential before
we study the impact of such differences in a context of strategic interactions. I show the systematic
belief differences are robust to monetary incentives for accuracy, do not depend on whether beliefs
and preferences are elicited first, and are not driven by people who are making more errors in the
experiment or by the direct elicitation method.
However, more importantly, both studies further contribute to our understanding of the rela-
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tionship between preferences and beliefs by ruling out previous empirical operationalizations. I
show, for the first time, that these differences do not depend on differences in choices alone. People
think others have underlying preferences similar to their own. Two people making the same choice
have systematically different beliefs about others’ choices, depending on the utility difference they
perceived between the two options the choice presented.
Another important finding is that relative differences in the deviations of beliefs are not person-
specific. As a person’s utility difference of the choice options varies across decision tasks, so does
his relative pessimism or optimism compared with the population. Therefore, a simple correlation
of preferences and these beliefs, as in Bellemare et al. (2008), cannot account for the form of the
relationship between preferences and beliefs about others’ choices across different decision tasks.
The relationship should be modeled at the individual- and game-specific level by allowing beliefs
to depend on how the individual values the options others are considering in that game.
Consequently, the documented relationship between beliefs and preferences has particular im-
plications for the required variation in belief data for preference inference from choices in strategic
contexts. First, beliefs should be elicited for several contexts over which the individual’s valuations
for the choice alternatives vary. Second, beliefs should span a broad range of objective probabil-
ities. If the range of probabilities is mainly restricted to one part of the [0,1] interval, potential
conservatism will be confounded with pessimism and/or systematic heterogeneity in beliefs.
In Study 1, I use a reduced form approach to study within-person belief differences across
games that present the dictator different relative positions. I find that the belief differences within
a person who has a high sensitivity to relative standing (large α-β difference) are larger than those
of a person with a lower sensitivity to relative standing. This finding means that regardless of how
altruistic people think others generally are, those who have large concern withdrawal when they
get less than the recipient think others display a higher sensitivity to relative position than those
who have less pronounced concern withdrawal do.
I also show that the act of having made a choice does not affect the impact it has on beliefs,
and subjects’ predicted choices relate to their beliefs in the same way their actual choices would.
This evidence suggests subjects’ commitment (or lack thereof) to a choice does not change their
beliefs about the decision task others face, which means researchers do not have to collect choice
data in the contexts in which beliefs are invoked; knowledge of estimates of the relevant preference
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parameters would suffice.
Given the evidence on the existence of systematic belief heterogeneity that violates the assump-
tion of mutual consistency and the type of relationship between preferences and beliefs that lead
to it, I proceed to studying strategic actions that depend on both one’s preferences as well as his
beliefs. My goal is to study the impact of this systematic belief heterogeneity on strategic actions,
and the resulting consequences for preference identification from these actions.
3.3 Study 3.
Decision makers take two factors into account when choosing the optimal action in any strategic
interaction: their evaluation of potential outcomes and the likelihood that each outcome will be
reached given that action. Beliefs about others’ actions shape these subjective probabilities. In
Study 3, I present a strategic game where subjects’ actions are based on their expectation of others’
actions in modified dictator games, as in Study 2. However, in addition to their beliefs, their own
preferences for altruism also guide their decisions. Thus, this game provides an example of how
beliefs and preferences found in strategic actions codetermine choice. First, I present evidence
of systematic differences in beliefs leading to discernable patterns in strategic actions. Then I
demonstrate the misestimation of preferences if the systematic heterogeneity in beliefs is ignored.
3.3.1 Procedures and Design
The third study involved 64 subjects to whom I presented a strategic social interaction in which
the outcome of a two-stage game depended on the choices of two players. The first player (Player
A) decided between taking a certain social allocation that determined both players payments or
deferring the choice to Player B. Player B, on the other hand, faced a dictator game and reported
her strategy without learning about Player A’s choice or the certain allocation Player A was con-
sidering17. Therefore, Player B’s decision in the sub-game depends only on Player B’s altruism for
an anonymous other person. Figure 3 illustrates this game:
Player A’s entry (deferral to Player B), along with the decision of the matched Player B’s in the
dictator sub-game jointly determine the outcome for both subjects. This game presents a scenario
in which Player A’s decision to defer to Player B not only depends on his beliefs about Player
17I used this limited information scenario to minimize positive reciprocity concerns, even though Charness and
Rabin(2002) and Gneezy (2000) fail to find any.
28
Figure 3: Example of a trust-dictator game.
B’s choice but also on Player A’s altruism. Therefore, it highlights the identification problem that
arises in disentangling heterogeneity of preferences from the heterogeneity in beliefs.
This two-stage game can be thought of as a trust/dictator game. Charness and Rabin (2002)
used this variant in characterizing social preferences without reciprocity. This game is also sim-
ilar in design to the wallet game in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000); however, it is importantly
differentiated by the information restriction that Player B only observes the sub-game.
A total of 64 subjects made 16 decisions in each of the two roles. Half of the subjects were first
in the role of Player A and then played dictator games (i.e. in the role of Player B). The other
half had the reverse sequence. The choice of deferral always involved a strict increase in payoffs for
Player B; however, subjects were not informed of this18. In half of the games, Player A was ahead
in all outcomes; in the other half of the games, Player B was ahead in all outcomes. At the end of
the experiment, the experimenter picked one game at random by a toss of several dice and made
payments by matching subjects anonymously according to a predetermined list that ensured each
subject was matched with a different person in the other role for each game. While this matching
took place, the last part of the experiment asked subjects to state their beliefs about the percentage
of other subjects who picked each option across several dictator games. The experiment provided
no monetary accuracy incentives for these beliefs, as the simultaneous nature of the experiment did
not permit accuracy determination. The appendix A1.3 contains further details of the study and
instructions.
18I did not find any evidence that those subjects who played the role of Player A first (and who might therefore
form beliefs that Player A’s entry helps Player B) had higher altruism later as Player B’s than those who were in the
role of Player B first. Therefore, either subjects did not think every deferral helped Player B, or they did not display
positive reciprocity.
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3.3.2 Evidence for Correlated Beliefs and Preferences
I observe considerable heterogeneity in entry decisions across Player A, depending on what they
chose in the sub-game Player B faces (Table 15). Although this heterogeneity mirrors the pattern
observed in Study 2, we cannot directly conclude that differences in beliefs drive this behavior.
Since I designed all two-stage games to pay the lowest outcome to Player B if Player A decided not
to defer, even if beliefs did not vary systematically across participants in the role of Player A, we
would expect those players who cared more about the payoffs of others to enter more often and to
pick altruistically in the role of Player B.
As Charness and Rabin (2002) also observed, in order to infer subjects’ social preferences from
their decisions in the trust-dictator games, we need to make assumptions about the beliefs they hold
concerning Player B’s behavior. Without an a priori restriction on beliefs, for example, that they
equal objective probabilities, the factor that drives Player A’s decisions is unclear. Is it preferences
or beliefs? We can circumvent this identification problem in two ways. The first is to collect data
on beliefs. The second is to collect other choice data that can help identify social preferences.
Subjects’ choices in the role of Player B provide such data in this study. Both sources of data help
document the impact of systematic differences in beliefs on strategic actions.
Let us investigate whether the assumption that people on average share common beliefs about
others can be maintained given the choice data across different games. Note that, by design, when
Player A decides whether to defer or take the social allocation where he gets more than Player B, I
have Player B face a sub-game where he gets less than Player A in both options. Referring back to
Table 1, we see that although the preference parameters α and β inferred from choices in dictator
games are positively correlated, considerable heterogeneity exists in the difference between these
two parameters within a person. This variation, along with the aforementioned design feature, is
central to the following demonstrations of the violation of the mutual consistency assumption.
First, consider a group of participants who are never willing to sacrifice to increase the other
player’s payoff if the other player’s payoff is already higher than their own (βi = 0). Some of these
individuals, however, may be somewhat altruistic when the other’s payoff is lower than their own
(αi > 0), whereas some may still be purely selfish (αi = 0). Now consider these participants’ entry
decisions in the role of Player A in games where Player B’s payoffs are higher than those of Player
A’s. In this decision context, Player A decides whether to take the social allocation or defer based
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on his degree of altruism βi as he is behind and his beliefs about what Player B may choose in the
sub-game. If beliefs are not systematically different, the variation in αi should not affect Player
A’s entry decision. However, I find that those with higher αi’s tend to enter such games more often
than those who are more selfish. Similarly, subjects with higher βi’s defer to Player B in trust-
dictator games where Player B is behind more often than subjects with lower βi’s do. Table 16
reports entry rates by pairs of preference parameters. The left-hand panel summarizes entry rates
in games where Player A is ahead and Player B is behind, and the right-hand panel summarizes
entry rates in games where Player A is behind and Player B is ahead. Since α is greater than or
equal to β for almost all individuals, we do not observe every combination of these two parameters.
However, a clear pattern of entry variation conditional on preferences emerges.
The results of a probit model of Player A’s choice of entry in Table 17 confirm the significance of
this pattern in the data. The variable “other’s parameter is the subject’s own preference parameter
in the shoes of Player B. For example, it is αi if Player B is ahead. The variable “own parameter”
is the subject’s own preference parameter as it applies to his role. For example, it is βi if Player A
is behind. The results in the first column show that, controlling for one’s degree of altruism as it
applies to the context he is facing, there is still a strong impact of the person’s degree of altruism
in the different context that Player B is facing. The second column introduces more controls.
Compared with the average propensity of other similarly altruistic Player A’s to enter in a gamble,
those who are more altruistic in the shoes of Player B enter more often.
This finding suggests that unless this systematic difference is controlled for, entry propensities
cannot be used to infer which Player A is more altruistic in the context he is facing. Consider
Player A1, who is very altruistic when ahead and completely selfish when behind, and Player A2
who is moderately altruistic in both cases. Now imagine we observe their choices in trust-dictator
games where they are ahead, and we are interested in their altruism in that position. As Player
A1 will have a more pessimistic expectation about the outcome of the sub-game, his propensity to
enter may not differ from that of Player A2, who has a more optimistic expectation. Therefore we
may erroneously conclude that they have similar levels of altruism, if we assume that their beliefs
are not systematically different.
Now I turn to the second model-free piece of evidence against mutually consistent beliefs. The
demonstration of this evidence also relies on the variation in the within-person difference of two
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preference parameters. Consider subjects who are much more altruistic when they are ahead than
when they are behind (high αi - βi difference) versus others who do not have as high a sensitivity
to relative position (low α - β difference). The subjects with a higher sensitivity to relative position
in dictator games should also display a higher sensitivity in trust-dictator games. In other words,
subjects with higher sensitivity to relative position display a larger disparity between their entry
propensities across games where they hold different positions. If we maintain the assumption that
beliefs do not systematically differ across Player As then we would expect, compared to rest of
Player As, Player As with higher α - β difference to defer much more frequently in trust-dictator
games where they are ahead compared to games where they are behind.
However, I find exactly the opposite. Table 18 presents the results of a binary probit regression
of entry choice. The explanatory variables include subject fixed effects to capture subjects’ mean
propensity to defer in trust-dictator games. Question fixed effects capture the mean entry behavior
across all subjects for a given trust-dictator game. I find that subjects with higher sensitivity to
relative position (high α - β difference) are less likely than usual to defer when they are ahead,
than are those with a lower sensitivity.
Note that we formulated our first expectation under the assumption of mutually consistent
beliefs, which allowed us to make predictions about differences in choice based purely on differences
in preferences. However, if Player A’s beliefs about Player B’s choice vary strongly based on what
he would do in Player B’s position then our expectations would change dramatically, as subjects
with higher sensitivity to relative position (high α - β difference) would also be more sensitive to
the impact of relative position on Player B’s choices.
To see how we can reach the opposite prediction under the hypothesis that subjects’ beliefs
about Player B’s choices are related to what they would have done in Player B’s position, note
that all the games share two important attributes by design. First, when Player A is ahead, he is
ahead in all outcomes of the trust-dictator game and Player B is behind. Second, entry is more
attractive if Player A is more altruistic when all else is equal. Therefore when Player A is ahead,
he should have a higher incentive to enter due to his social preferences, but competing disincentive
to enter due to the expectation that Player B is less likely to choose altruistically when behind.
Although the disincentive may exist all subjects, the more sensitive a subject is to his own relative
standing, the more he may also be sensitive to Player B’s relative standing. When subjects with a
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higher α - β difference put themselves in the shoes of Player B, they will predict a higher difference
in Player B’s propensity to choose altruistically as Player B’s relative position changes. Therefore,
if beliefs carry enough weight in Player A’s decisions, subjects with a higher α - β difference may
avoid games where they are ahead, more than those with a lower α - β difference would19.
In appendix A3.2, I report estimates from a model recovers beliefs from observed actions. I find
that the beliefs which rationalize actions correlate with preferences, replicating the evidence from
previous studies that elicited beliefs in different ways.
3.3.3 Summary and Discussion of Study 3 Results
In Study 3, I provide the first strategic choice evidence congruent with the existence of heterogeneous
beliefs. I show that heterogeneity in entry decisions in a strategic game is systematically related to
the first mover’s individual preferences in the context that the second mover faces. If the person
would have been selfish in the sub-game, then he is less trusting of others. Note that people
demonstrate sensitivity to the differences in the context between themselves and others. While
making decisions in an advantageous position, their beliefs about the choice of the other person,
who is in a disadvantageous position, are influenced by their own degree of concern for others when
they are in that same disadvantageous position themselves. In other words, they are able to put
themselves in the shoes of the other person and base their beliefs on what they would do under
those circumstances.
The evidence from Study 3 demonstrates how significant the impact of systematic heterogeneity
in beliefs can be on strategic decisions. Differences in beliefs so strongly influence differences in
deferral decisions that the decisions observed are the opposite of what we would expect if we assume
individuals are best responding to homogenous expectations. This impact results in strategic deci-
sions that are seemingly inconsistent with subjects’ choices in dictator games. However, systematic
differences in beliefs can explain these reversals.
If we maintain the assumption of mutual consistency in beliefs is maintained for inference, two
main biases arise. First, the decisions (in the role of player A) of those subjects who are moderately
19Even though I find no reason to expect a reversal in the sensitivity to relative standing, I also entertain the idea
that social preferences in different roles might be different. Therefore, I use the elicited beliefs to capture the impact
of differences in beliefs on entry behavior. When I incorporate elicited beliefs rather than maintain an assumption of
mutual consistency, the relative entry behavior is consistent with the relative altruism in dictator games. This finding
suggests systematic differences in beliefs, and not the impact of roles, produce the seemingly inconsistent pattern of
behavior. Results are available upon request.
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altruistic when ahead, but very selfish when behind will be interpreted as selfish even when ahead.
I will demonstrate this bias in the following section. Second, the choices (in the role of Player A)
of those subjects who have a high sensitivity to relative standing will result in the inference that
they have a low sensitivity to relative standing.
4 Implications of systematic heterogeneity in beliefs
4.1 Misestimation of preferences
The findings of all three studies show that ignoring the systematic heterogeneity in beliefs about
altruism is misleading. This section aims to detail the identification consequences of assuming
objective probabilities for beliefs when this heterogeneity is present20.
In the first simulation, I consider the same two-stage trust-dictator game as in Study 3. I start
with a joint distribution of α and β as demonstrated on the top panel of Figure 5. For parsimony,
I allow for the people who choose selfishly in the dictator sub-game to overestimate the percentage
of selfish choices in the population by 10% and those who choose altruistically to underestimate it
by the same amount. I simulate the choices of Player A in games where trusting increases social
welfare as in Study 3 and where Player A is behind in all outcomes. I then infer Player A’s β from
his decisions assuming rational expectations.
The lower panel of Figure 5 displays the distribution of estimated parameters. The shading
allows us to see which individuals are miscategorized and in what direction. If people hold common
beliefs, then we would expect those with higher β’s to defer the decision to Player B more often, as
entry increases social welfare. Those with relatively higher α’s, who are therefore more optimistic
beliefs about Player B’s altruism, are miscategorized as having higher β’s.
I also repeat the exercise for games where trusting in others’ altruism hurts Player B. In such
games, a more altruistic Player A is less likely to enter than a more selfish Player A if they share
the same beliefs. Figure 6 displays the distortion in the estimated preference distribution. The
participants whose α’s are small, meaning they would be selfish in the shoes of Player B, are
relatively less likely to enter than if they had the correct beliefs. Under the assumption of mutual
consistency, we would misinterpret this behavior as them having more concern for Player B.
20To highlight the role of systematic individual deviations, I do not allow for conservatism in these demonstrations.
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Figure 4: Simulation depicting biases in preference estimation when trusting increases social welfare.
	  
Figure 5: Simulation depicting biases in preference estimation when trusting decreases social wel-
fare.
	  
4.2 Broader Implications for Future Research and Discussion
The evidence of systematic heterogeneity in beliefs is congruent with the intuition that people form
their belief distributions of others’ choices based on how far they see themselves from choosing
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each of the options. Understanding the reason for this projection is beyond the scope of this paper
and does not impact its results or conclusions. We might base our educated guesses on the false
consensus literature, which has provided two potential reasons for why people think more support
exists for an option if they picked that option. The first is based on the premise that one’s own
position acts as the prior on which beliefs are based (Hoch 1987, Dawes 1989). The second is
based on egocentrism and claims people are not sufficiently able to allow for the fact that even
beyond informational reasons, others might be different from them (Krueger and Clement 1994).
Future research can investigate whether the reason for projection impacts if and how the correlation
between preferences and beliefs evolve in repeated interactions.
If projection results from informational differences, whether the differences across individuals
in their beliefs are initial differences that can be eradicated by learning in repeated interactions
depends on the type of information these individuals can get in equilibrium. If individuals observe
others’ actions, two further research questions arise given the results in this paper. First, how do
people make inferences about the underlying preferences behind others’ choices in order to predict
their future choices more precisely? Given that peoples’ ability to infer others’ preferences from
their observed choices suffers from the same confounds this paper discusses due to unobservable
beliefs, it is important to understand their inference process. Second, do people with different
preferences learn differently? Since individuals systematically differ in their beliefs, which subset
of all possible sub-games they get exposed to in the market depends on these beliefs, limiting equal
chance of learning from real-world realizations. Studying the role and extent of such selection in
learning due to heterogeneity in initial priors can help answer the long-term market impact of the
relationship between preferences and beliefs on strategic actions.
The evidence of systematic heterogeneity in beliefs may also be congruent with beliefs impacting
preferences instead, due to a need to conform. In a different context, Orhun and Urminsky (2009)
provide evidence that manipulated changes in preferences lead to changes in beliefs. This evidence is
consistent with projection, rather than with an alternative account that beliefs influence preferences.
However, the current paper does not directly test between these accounts, as the source of the
correlation does not impact the contribution and implications of the paper. Regardless of its
source, this correlation would impact strategic actions in the same way and inference from strategic
choices would be similarly hindered. Importantly, the evidence this paper presents on the specific
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form of the correlation would still be crucial for appropriately modeling it. However, if future
research proves that altruism is indeed constructed from beliefs and the need to conform, then the
preference specifications in the behavioral economics literature that are used to capture altruistic
behavior would need to be revised to correctly specify the underlying reason for seemingly-kind
behavior. This account would also raise the next important question: if differences in preferences
are due to differences in beliefs, where do the differences in beliefs come from?
Related to the question of how people would form beliefs about others’ preferences from their
choices, we can also ask how people form beliefs about others’ beliefs. When a selfish Player B
observes that Player A deferred the decision to her, benefiting her outcome and risking his own,
does she think Player A expected Player B to return the favor, or does she think Player A was acting
mainly out of altruism? Given that beliefs about others’ preferences depend on own preferences,
do beliefs about beliefs differ across people, and if so, what do they relate to? Geanakoplos et
al. (1989), Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Gneezy et al. (2000), and Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2000, 2004) noted contexts where beliefs should be incorporated directly into
one’s utility function, as people might care about why the other person behaved in a certain way.
Extending this paper’s approach to reciprocity would require models of reciprocal behavior to allow
not only individual differences in social preferences, but also individual differences in beliefs about
the intensions of others. Heterogeneity in beliefs about the intensions of others, therefore, will be
an important concern in future research in teasing out factors that drive reciprocal behavior.
Lastly, note that what people think others’ preferences are may affect how they allocate re-
sources, even in a non-strategic setting. If welfare is defined over the utilities of the parties involved,
rather than over outcomes, what a social planner or a benevolent dictator thinks others’ preferences
are will have an important effect on the choice of the allocation profile. As research moves toward
defining welfare over utilities rather than outcomes, this issue is bound to become a centerpiece of
discussion.
5 Conclusion
In a series of experiments, I document considerable heterogeneity in beliefs about others’ choices in
a given decision context, which is at odds with the commonly used mutual consistency assumption
for making preference inferences from strategic choices. These differences in beliefs correlate with
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differences in individuals’ evaluations of the options in the given decision context. In a strategic
game involving trust and altruism, I demonstrate that if the assumption of mutual consistency is
maintained, people’s strategic actions would lead to an inference of altruistic preferences that is
inconsistent with preferences inferred from non-strategic actions. In particular, differences between
individuals in their trust of others are the opposite of what we would expect if we assumed indi-
viduals are best responding to homogenous expectations. I show that these results are congruent
with differences in expectations of altruism that result from putting one’s self in the other’s posi-
tion. I then detail how ignoring this heteroskedasticity results in mis-estimation of the preference
distribution.
In general, the solution to the problem of preference inference from strategic choices should rely
on augmenting the data such that identification does not rely on assumptions about unverifiable
beliefs. The first possibility is to collect additional choice data that produce variation in choices,
keeping beliefs constant. For example, in the two-stage game considered in this paper, such variation
can be obtained by keeping the dictator sub-game constant, while varying the payoff of Player B
in the case of Player A choosing not to trust. However this type of a solution may not be generally
feasible. The second solution, as Manski (2004) points out, is to measure expectations.
Especially in situations where the researchers would like to test for non-standard preferences
using deviations from normative behaviors in strategic interactions, collecting data on beliefs rather
than making an assumption is paramount. A priori, whether individuals are not behaving in line
with the normative prescription due to sub-optimal best-responding, non-standard preferences, or
due to beliefs that systematically deviate from objective beliefs is unclear. The need to separate
the inability to best respond to one’s beliefs from potentially wrong beliefs about others has been
recognized by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Camerer et al. (2004), but in their applications this
necessity was addressed by making an alternative assumption about the particular relationship be-
tween beliefs about others and one’s own ability to reason21. Recently, experimental studies directly
elicit expectations about others’ actions to address the inference problem. Expectation measure-
ment helps Bellemare et al. (2008) address whether giving more than the normative prediction of
zero in an ultimatum game is motivated by preferences or beliefs about responders’ reactions. In
a different context, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) use elicited beliefs about others’ contributions
21This assumption, motivated by the need for internal consistency, generates a correlation between the beliefs about
the sophistication of others’ thinking and one’s own sophistication.
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to separate the role of changing beliefs from the role of cooperation preferences in explaining the
decline of contributions to a public good played repeatedly.
While this paper agrees with the previous literature on the necessity of eliciting beliefs, it also
highlights the importance of knowing the way in which beliefs deviate from the rational expectations
assumption to achieve correct inference even when belief data is available. In particular, in contexts
where the correlation of beliefs and actions needs to be modeled, knowing the correct relationship
between beliefs and preferences is essential in informing the requirements for data collection and
statistical modeling. The results show that the relationship between preferences and beliefs is
different than what previous empirical operationalizations allowed for. Differences in beliefs do
not depend on differences in choices alone, as assumed in the false consensus literature, neither
are they captured solely by subject-specific factors, as assumed in Bellemare et al. (2008). If
researchers find it important to allow for a correlation of beliefs and actions in any given context,
an individual’s belief about the choice of others in a decision task should be allowed to vary with
the differences between the individual’s own valuations of different options in the same task. How
much the individual values each option can be directly elicited or predicted based on the individual’s
preferences.
This paper has shown that the correlation between preferences and beliefs about others’ actions
will impact strategic choices and bias the estimation of preferences; thus empirical studies should
appropriately take it into account. I expect the results to generalize to a broad array of uncertain
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Table 1. Joint frequency distribution of degrees of altruism when the decision maker is 
ahead or behind in relative standing to the recipient. 
 
 beta (behind)  
alpha (ahead) 0 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.41 Total 
0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 
0.12 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
0.15 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 7 
0.21 2 0 2 1 0 1 1 7 
0.26 2 4 2 0 0 1 0 9 
0.34 7 0 1 2 3 0 0 13 
0.41 13 1 6 2 2 4 4 32 
Total 53 8 11 6 5 6 5 94 
 
 
Table 2. Study 1, Session 1. Actual Play, Average Beliefs, and Beliefs by Own Action in 
the given game. (200 Tokens=$1) 
 
Selfish Option Sacrifice Option % Average Avg. Beliefs Avg. Beliefs 
Self Other Self Other Selfish Beliefs were selfish sacrificed 
850 200 750 600 0.33 0.58 0.78 0.48 
650 200 600 300 0.33 0.56 0.71 0.49 
750 150 700 450 0.17 0.40 0.58 0.36 
900 150 800 450 0.29 0.57 0.70 0.52 
700 300 600 600 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.47 
500 150 450 450 0.25 0.54 0.78 0.46 
750 0 650 200 0.33 0.49 0.64 0.42 
 
 
Table 3. Study 1, Session 2: Actual Play, Average Beliefs, and Beliefs by Actual or 
Potential Action in the given game. (200 tokens= $1) 
 
Selfish Option Sacrifice 
Option 
%  Average Avg. Beliefs Avg. 
Beliefs 
Avg. Beliefs Avg. Beliefs 
Self Other Self Other Selfish Beliefs if sacrificed if selfish if would sacrif if would 
selfish 750 200 650 400 0.58 0.56   0.51 0.62 
900 0 800 300 0.21 0.40 0.35 0.61 0.24 0.57 
800 300 700 600 0.46 0.54 0.47 0.75 0.34 0.61 
500 150 450 450 0.38 0.47 0.37 0.65   
700 200 550 400 0.75 0.64   0.48 0.74 
650 200 600 300 0.33 0.52   0.48 0.57 
750 0 700 100 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.51   
850 200 750 600 0.38 0.42 0.31 0.59   
700 200 600 600 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.56 0.34 0.63 
900 200 850 400 0.38 0.41   0.37 0.46 
650 200 600 500 0.17 0.48   0.39 0.83 
650 300 600 600 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.57   
900 0 600 400 0.54 0.48 0.26 0.65   
500 200 400 400 0.38 0.58 0.49 0.72   
750 0 700 300 0.15 0.30 0.26 0.57   
950 0 750 300 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.72   
 
 
Table 4. Study 1, Session 3: Actual Play, Average Beliefs, and Beliefs by Potential 
Action in the given game. (200 Tokens=$1) 
Selfish Option Sacrifice Option %  Average Avg. Beliefs Avg. Beliefs 
Self Other Self Other Selfish Beliefs if would sacrif if would selfish 
750 350 700 500 0.27 0.57 0.53 0.61 
300 350 250 500 0.47 0.72 0.57 0.77 
600 200 500 400 0.47 0.74 0.63 0.83 
350 400 300 800 0.27 0.60 0.55 0.69 
400 500 200 800 0.87 0.77 0.40 0.80 
150 200 50 600 0.80 0.70 0.68 0.71 
750 300 700 600 0.13 0.52 0.45 0.68 
600 650 550 750 0.80 0.74 0.65 0.78 
750 150 700 550 0.27 0.59 0.53 0.82 
750 200 650 500 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.68 
700 300 600 500 0.47 0.52 0.30 0.71 
800 200 700 600 0.27 0.50 0.44 0.68 
250 300 200 600 0.47 0.48 0.35 0.55 
850 250 750 400 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.70 
250 300 200 700 0.40 0.54 0.46 0.77 
250 300 150 500 0.73 0.68 0.56 0.71 
200 200 100 500 0.67 0.74 0.55 0.84 
850 300 800 700 0.27 0.37 0.31 0.73 
300 450 200 600 0.93 0.75 0.20 0.79 
800 300 750 600 0.27 0.42 0.37 0.77 
 
 
Table 5. Study 1. Tobit regression of elicited beliefs about propensity of selfishness. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
rho (choice=selfish) 0.284*** 0.089** 0.114*** 0.053* 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.027) (0.031) 
delta (preference intensity)  0.678***  0.493*** 
  (0.112)  (0.116) 
Constant 0.518*** 0.617*** 0.827*** 0.877*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.093) (0.092) 
Observations 521 521 521 521 
Question FE’s yes yes yes yes 
Subject FE’s   yes yes 
Log Likelihood -56.46 -38.66 127.5 134.8 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
Table 6. Table 4, Column 1, broken down over the sessions. 
 
VARIABLES Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
rho  0.314*** 0.345*** 0.280*** 
 (0.061) (0.048) (0.028) 
Constant 0.429*** 0.631*** 0.460*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.020) 
Observations 84 148 289 
Question FE’s yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -11.64 -44.87 -19.01 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Table 7. Study 1. Session 3. Tobit regression of elicited beliefs about propensity of selfishness. 


















Table 8. Study 1. Session 2. Impact of having taken an action in the task about which beliefs 
are elicited. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
rho  0.318*** 0.053 0.045 
 (0.069) (0.092) (0.107) 
delta   0.802*** 0.753*** 
  (0.222) (0.255) 
nu 1 ((new=0) * (choice=selfish)) 0.069  -0.082 
 (0.108)  (0.225) 
nu 2 ((new=0) * preference 
intensity)   -0.522 
   (0.566) 
nu 3 ((new=0)) 0.131  0.094 
 (0.104)  (0.121) 
Constant    
    
Log Likelihood -39.372 -38.590 -37.338 
Observations 148 148 148 
Question FE’s yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses    







VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 (α - β)*(dictator ahead) -0.853*** -0.743*** 
 (0.224) (0.145) 
dictator ahead  -0.066* 
  (0.038) 
(α - β)  0.138 
  (0.145) 
Constant 0.696*** 0.671*** 
 (0.012) (0.027) 
Log Likelihood 35.26 -52.78 
Observations 298 298 
Question FE’s yes no 
Subject FE’s yes no 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 9. Study 1. Differences in the correlation between preferences and beliefs based on 











(Sacrifice) %  sure  
certainty equivalent / entry % at the sure 
payoff  
Self 
$ Other $ Self $ Other $ selfish payoff avg if selfish if sacrificed 
8.50 3.00 8.00 7.00 11.5     
2.50 3.00 2.00 7.00 61.5 $4.50 
   4.29 / 
42%  4.16 / 37% 4.44 / 48% 
6.50 2.00 6.00 5.00 15.4 $3.00 3.71 / 82 %  3.50 / 70 % 3.80 / 85 % 
2.50 3.00 2.00 6.00 58.7 $4.25 4.00 / 32 %  3.74 / 19% 4.58 / 46% 
7.50 3.50 7.00 5.00 26.9     
3.00 3.50 2.50 5.00 80.8 $4.25 3.86 /18%  3.85 / 15% 3.88 / 30% 
5.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 26.9 $3.00 2.80 /30%  2.63 / 17% 2.88 / 38% 
6.00 6.50 5.50 7.50 84.6     
7.50 1.50 7.00 5.50 20.0 $3.00 3.55 /76%  2.65 / 50% 3.72 / 81 % 
3.50 4.00 3.00 8.00 48.0     
8.00 3.00 7.50 6.00 24.0     
2.50 3.00 2.00 6.00 48.0     
8.00 3.00 7.00 6.00 36.0 $4.25 4.19 / 50%  4.01 / 38 % 4.27 / 56% 
2.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 80.0     
7.00 3.00 6.00 5.00 48.0     












Log Likelihood -48.029 
Observations 521 
Question FE’s yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 12. Study 2. Ordered probit model of certainty equivalents in titrations of gambles with 





Table 13. Study 2. Probit model of entry in gambles on altruism. 
 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
altruism (ahead) -0.039  -0.002 
 (0.075)  (0.087) 
altruism (behind)  -0.073 -0.072 
  (0.076) (0.088) 
Constant    
    
Log Likelihood -107.75 -107.42 -107.42 
Observations 204 204 204 
Gamble FE’s yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
altruism (ahead) -0.046  -0.067 
 (0.056)  (0.064) 
altruism (behind)  0.008 0.042 
  (0.055) (0.063) 
Constant    
    
Log Likelihood -398.94 -399.27 -398.72 
Observations 203 203 203 
Gamble FE’s yes yes yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
own choice = selfish  -0.517*** -0.134* -0.556** 
 (0.149) (0.065) (0.238) 
preference intensity  -0.974*  
  (0.433)  
Constant -0.338 -0.369 -0.376 
 (0.260) (0.199) (0.587) 
Gamble FE’s yes yes yes 
Subject FE’s   yes 
Log Likelihood -211.45 -189.33 -139.22 
Observations 408 408 360 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 












Payoffs % selfish % enter 
Self Other Self Other Self Other  avg if selfish if sacrificed 
750 350 700 500 375 600 28.13 65.63 44.4 73.9 
850 300 800 700 400 700 31.25 75.00   
750 150 700 550 300 600 31.25 56.25 30.0 68.1 
750 300 700 600 400 600 31.25 65.63   
800 200 700 600 350 600 33.42 54.69 29.17 67.27 
800 300 750 600 350 650 34.38 71.88 45.5 85.7 
750 350 700 500 375 600 40.63 81.25   
700 300 600 500 350 500 40.63 62.50 53.8 68.4 
800 200 700 600 300 600 42.19 59.38 41.48 75.45 
750 200 650 500 300 550 43.75 40.63   
750 200 650 500 300 550 43.75 56.25 35.7 72.2 
850 250 750 400 275 650 50.00 43.75   
350 400 300 800 550 200 56.25 21.88   
600 200 500 400 275 400 56.25 59.38   
250 300 200 700 400 150 59.38 43.75   
350 400 300 800 550 200 59.38 37.50 15.8 69.2 
250 300 200 600 400 150 64.06 21.88 10.15 40.77 
250 300 200 600 350 150 67.19 51.56 32.47 90.00 
250 300 200 700 400 150 68.75 15.63 9.1 30.0 
800 150 600 450 200 500 71.88 46.88 39.1 66.7 
300 350 250 500 375 200 78.13 37.50   
400 500 300 900 650 200 81.25 25.00   
150 200 50 600 300 50 81.25 25.00 11.5 83.3 
600 650 550 750 700 500 84.38 25.00   
300 450 200 600 475 100 87.50 50.00   
200 200 100 500 300 50 90.63 15.63 13.8 33.3 
250 300 150 500 350 100 96.88 12.50 12.9 0.0 
400 500 200 800 550 150 96.88 31.25 29.0 100.0 
 
Experiment A first Experiment B first 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
own action = selfish  -0.489** -0.714** -0.572*** -0.440 
 (0.213) (0.296) (0.221) (0.306) 
new * own action = selfish  0.442  -0.296 
  (0.393)  (0.453) 
new  -0.461  -0.077 
  (0.238)  (0.282) 
Constant -0.288 -0.002 -0.391 -0.420 
 (0.261) (0.317) (0.300) (0.350) 
Gamble FE’s yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -112.50 -111.15 -94.36 -93.78 
Observations 224 224 161 161 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 16.  Study 3. Player A entry rates by pairs of preference parameters for two types of 
games (different relative position of players). 
 
Player A ahead, Player B behind Player A behind, Player B ahead 
alpha beta entry rate beta alpha entry rate 
0 0 0.146 0 0 0.382 
0.12 0 0.375 0 0.12 0.438 
0.15 0 0.208 0 0.15 0.5 
0.15 0.12 0 0 0.21 0.5 
0.15 0.21 0.375 0 0.26 0.688 
0.21 0 0.188 0 0.34 0.55 
0.21 0.15 0.75 0 0.41 0.693 
0.26 0 0.188 0.12 0.15 0.5 
0.26 0.12 0.125 0.12 0.26 1 
0.26 0.15 0.5 0.15 0.21 0.75 
0.34 0 0.275 0.15 0.26 0.75 
0.34 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.34 0.375 
0.34 0.21 0.625 0.15 0.41 0.833 
0.34 0.26 0.75 0.21 0.15 0.625 
0.41 0 0.193 0.21 0.34 0.625 
0.41 0.15 0.417 0.21 0.41 0.875 
0.41 0.21 0.688 0.26 0.34 0.688 
0.41 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.41 1 
0.41 0.34 0.875 0.34 0.41 1 




Table 17. Study 3. Probit model of Player A’s entry decisions. Impact of altruism in the shoes 
of Player B. 
 
 Variables (1) (2) 
 enter enter 
other’s parameter  3.797*** 3.142*** 
 (0.277) (0.375) 
own parameter FE yes yes 
question FE  yes 
question*own param FE  yes 
Constant -0.777*** -1.099* 
 (0.077) (0.586) 
Observations 944 760 
Log Likelihood -544 -406.1 
Standard errors in parentheses  






Table 18. Study 3. Probit model of Player A’s entry decisions. Within-person difference in 




(α - β)*(Player A ahead, Player B behind) -2.174*** 
 (0.700) 
subject FE yes 




Log Likelihood -387.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
	  
